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The Effect in Choice of Law Cases of
the Acquisition of a New Domicile
After the Commission of a Tort or the
Making of a Contract
By MOFFATT HANCOCK*
B.A., S.J.D., LL.D., Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; formerly Viscount Bennett Professor of Law,
DalhousieUniversity Law School, and MarionRice Kirkwood Professor
of Law Emeritus, Stanford University Law Sehool.

"Interest analysis, like other methods of approaching choiceof-law, is not perfect. But it has the virtue of recognizing that laws
are adopted in order to accomplish social goals and that they
should be applied so as to carry out their purposes. Enlightened
courts have followed this principle for years in non-conflicts cases
David P. Currie'

I.
When judges were expected to decide choice of law cases by
manipulating indiscriminate, state-selecting, territorial principles,

the problem herein discussed received very little attention; the laws
of the parties' domiciles were supposed to have no significance in
torts and contracts cases. 2 Though judges sometimes applied a domestic rule of the forum because the parties were domiciled or doing
* The author acknowledges his indebtedness to his collaborator, Mimi Reichert, who
wrote the footnotes and revised the text.
This article is, with gracious permission of the Editor-in-Chief, Claudia Brooks, dedicated to David F. Cavers, Fessenden Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
1. Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 595, 605 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930), in which the court, in
applying Mexican law to a fire insurance policy issued in Mexico, stated: "The fact that
Dick's (the plaintiff) permanent residence was in Texas is without significance." See also
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 127 (1903), in which Justice Holmes, speaking
for the Court, stated: "As the cause of action relied upon is one which is.
supposed to have
arisen in Mexico under Mexican laws, the place of the death and the domicile of the parties
have no bearing upon the case."
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business there, they could do so only by classifying the rule as pro3
cedural, matrimonial, or as a rule embodying strong public policy.
With the advent of policy-determined analysis in the state courts it
becomes obvious that the domiciles of the parties would constitute
important contacts supporting the application of state policies.4
Cases involving a post-transaction change of domicile fall into
two obviously different categories: those in which the law of the new
domicile would, if applied, enure to the advantage of the changing
party and those in which it would enure to the disadvantage of the
changing party. Problems of both categories have proven to be singularly intractable.5 Brainerd Currie discussed those of the first
category in no less than six different articles with considerable shift
of emphasis in the last two.' In a 1968 symposium on the California
case of Reich v. Purcell7 (opinion for a unanimous court by Chief
Justice Traynor), six commentators expressed sharply divergent
views on problems of the first category.' And, in the same year, the
New York Court of Appeals divided four to three on the solution to
a problem of the second category.'
Let us consider first a simple hypothetical case wherein the law
3. See Paulsen and Soyern, "PublicPolicy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. Rv.
969 (1956).
4. See Hancock, Anti-Guest Statutes and Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of
Laws, 1 DALHousiE L.J. 105, 122-126 (1973). For examples of cases where recovery was allowed
solely on the basis of one party's domicile, see Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1973); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139,
158 N.W.2d 254 (1968). See also Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973), where
the finding of liability was based solely on the defendant's domicile.
5. For further discussion of these problems, see WEmTrau,

COMMENTARY ON THE CON-

s.c'r OF LAWS 249-53 (1971); Note, Post Transactionor OccUrrenceEvents in Conflict of Laws,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 865 (1969). This essay does not attempt to examine the various
important problems created by a post transaction change of domicile in relation to statutes
of limitation. For a discussion of this problem, see Vernon, The Uniform Statute of Limitations on ForeignClaims Act: Tolling Problems, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 971 (1959); Ester, Borrowing
Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA. L. Rav. 33 (1962); Note,
Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1177 (1950).
6. See Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 229, 235, 620, 736, 739 (1963);
and Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments:A Role for Congress, Tan 1964 Sup.
CT. REv. 91-99.

In a series of eloquent and highly persuasive articles written between 1957 and 1963,
Professor Brainerd Currie argued vigorously that state courts should adopt "state-interest
analysis" in deciding choice of law cases.
7. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
8. See Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 551 (1968); Russell J. Weintraub, 556; Eugene F. Scoles, 563; Herma Hill Kay, 584; David P. Currie, 595; Robert A.
Gorman, 605; Harold W. Horowitz, 631.
9. See text accompanying note 61, infra, discussing Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968).
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of one party's newly-acquired post-transaction domicile would, if
applied, enure to his advantage. Guest, a self-employed real estate
agent, was domiciled in state Blue, whose anti-guest statute required proof of wilful or wanton misconduct. On March 1st he entered into a contract of employment with a corporation engaged in
land development and marketing in state Red; his services to begin
on the following September 1. Soon after, he arranged, through
friends, to rent a house in state Red which would provide lodging
for himself and his family in late August. On April 1, while Guest
was riding (without charge) in Host's car, Guest was severely injured as a result of Host's negligent driving in state Blue. Guest
incurred heavy medical expenses, and was unable to return to his
work until June 15. While he was in the hospital, his wife retained
counsel in state Blue who, after investigation, decided to sue Host
in that state. In November, three months after Guest and his family
had moved to state Red, his counsel discovered that, although state
Red had enacted an anti-guest statute in 1928, the statute had been
repealed a year before Guest's accident. Twenty-three months after
the accident, at a time when Guest was obviously domiciled in state
Red, his counsel advised him to bring suit against Host in that state
and the suit was filed there.
Of the several well-known policies that anti-guest statutes are
supposed to implement,10 only one would be relevant to this case:
the protection of Host from the embarassment of litigation and the
risk of a large judgment against him, resulting in higher future
insurance premiums. On the other hand, now that Guest and his
family have become domiciled in state Red, that state has an obvious interest in alleviating the financial burden Guest and his family will have to bear if their economic losses are not compensated
by the enforcement of state Red's higher standard of careful driving.
This argument, of course, brings us squarely up against what is
generally called a true conflict problem, the compensatory policy of
state Red favoring Guest and his family conflicts with state Blue's
policy of partially protecting kind-hearted host-drivers from civil
damages. How should the state Red court resolve the dilemma pre10. The most commonly cited policies that anti-guest statutes are supposed to implement include: (1) to protect host drivers from liability in a situation where they had previously offered the guest a free ride; (2) to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by
passengers in collusion with the drivers against insurance companies; and (3) to keep down
the cost of automobile insurance. These policies are fully discussed in Hancock, Anti-Guest
Statutes and Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws: Techniques for Resolving
Ostensible True Conflict Cases and ConstitutionalLimitations, 1 DALHousm L.J. 105 (1973).
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sented by two inconsistent rules, each apparently entitled to some
consideration?
The problem of resolving true conflict cases is generally regarded as the major difficulty encountered by courts employing
state policy analysis. However, with commentarial assistance,
courts have managed to resolve true conflict cases in various ways.
Sometimes it has been possible to show that the consequences of
subverting one state's law and policy would be much less serious
and frustrating than those of subverting the law and policy of the
other state. Sometimes it has been possible to show that the courts
of one state have, in purely domestic cases, drastically reduced the
operative scope of their local rule; this has been held to justify the
application of the other state's conflicting rule in choice-of-law
cases. Anti-guest statutes have also been subverted in true-conflict
cases on the ground that they are anachronistic and discriminatory
laws, hastily adopted at a time when highway traffic deaths and
injuries were far less common than they are today, and many drivers
were not insured against accident liability.
However, for our hypothetical post-injury change of domicile
case, the foregoing techniques of reconciliation are quite unnecessary. Prior to the time when Guest moved into state Red, all the
operative facts on which Host's liability would have depended had
occurred in state Blue and nothing happened thereafter that would
justify resort to the law of state Red except Guest's unilateral selfdetermined act of changing his domicile. Would it not be, in some
degree, unfair to Host to allow Guest to deprive him, in this onesided way of the protection of the law of the state of which both were
citizens when their accident occurred there? Moreover, by the same
one-sided act of Guest, State Blue's policy of protecting its citizen,
Host, would be subverted in this and all similar cases.
It is submitted that the change of domicile issue can best be
viewed in its total perspective by considering the case as a true
conflict case in which, at the time of the litigation, a rational argument can be made for the application of each state's pertinent rule
and policy. But because, when the operative facts that would determine Host's liability occurred, state Red had no contact of concern
with those facts, fairness to Host and to state Blue suggest that the
conflict can best be resolved by preferring the law and policy of state
Blue.
This mode of analysis may be further illustrated by applying it
to a slightly more complex hypothetical example. Suppose (without
change in the pattern of laws) that both Host and Guest were origi-
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nally domiciled in state Red and that it was not Guest but Host who
had arranged to change his domicile, from state Red to state Blue.
After the arrangements had been made, the accident in which
Guest, riding as a non-paying passenger, was injured occurred, not
in state Red, but in state Blue. Host proceeded to carry out his plans
for moving to state Blue, and acquired a domicile there. Guest then
brought suit against Host in state Red.
Had no change of domicile occurred, the state Red court would
have encountered a very simple no-conflict, choice-of-law case of a
well-known pattern." State Red would have had a strong and legitimate concern for compensating Guest; no policy of state Blue would
have been advanced by applying its anti-guest statute to prevent
such compensation. But when Host became a citizen of state Blue
that state acquired an undeniable concern that he should be protected from liability for ordinary negligence. Some rational means
of resolving this conflict would have to be found. Again we note the
unfairness of allowing one party (Host) to acquire a defense by his
own unilateral act. Again, it is suggested that, because of this unfairness, the conflict should be resolved by ignoring the change of
domicile and so applying the law afid policy of State Red.
II.
An alternative suggestion for resolving this peculiar type of
true-conflict case should be briefly considered. Some commentators
have been impressed by the possibility that a party to a potential
lawsuit might purposely change his domicile in order to establish an
important contact with a state whose pertinent rule would favor his
claim or defense. 2 (Such deliberate contact creating is often loosely
labelled "forum shopping.") The chief difficulty with this approach
to the problem is that it would cover only a small fraction of the
contact creation cases. In the first of the foregoing hypothetical
examples both Guest and his counsel were clearly innocent of any
ulterior motive when he moved to state Red; nevertheless, to allow
state Red's rule to prevail would have been most unfair to Host and
to state Blue. Deliberate creation of favorable contacts should certainly not be encouraged but its actual occurrence is probably rather
11. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H.
351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Comments on Reich v. Purcell, supra note 8, at 562 (comment by Wein-

traub), and at 582 (comment by Ehrenzweig).
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rare. How often can a party afford to migrate to another state on
the speculative chance that a court there will apply its law to a prior
transaction? On the other hand, if a party does change his domicile
under suspicious circumstances, can that be held against him if he
can show a strong, legitimate reason for having done so? It is certainly not surprising that, although Brainerd Currie wrestled with
the problem on several occasions, he never alluded to the danger of
deliberate contact creation. However, astute counsel, opposing resort to the law of a state to which one party has recently moved, will
not let the judges overlook the possibility of purposeful contact creation.
Brainerd Currie was impressed to an extent that varied from
time to time by the usefulness of the analogy between the application of the law of a post-transaction domicile and the application
(in a purely domestic case) of a retroactive statute imposing liability
where none had existed when the operative facts occurred. 3 If in our
first Guest-Host hypothetical example, state Red's ordinary negligence standard had been applied to determine Host's liability, it
could be said to have been applied "retroactively" in the sense that
at the time of the accident, neither the parties, nor the facts had
any contact with state Red. It is trite learning that the retroactive
application, in purely domestic cases, of certain types of statutes to
transactions occurring before their enactment has been judicially
condemned on constitutional grounds.
The analogy of a purely domestic retroactive statute to our first
hypothetical choice-of-law example is obvious but, on careful examination, superficial and potentially misleading. Suppose that when
the state Red legislature repealed its anti-guest statute (thus reviving the stricter common law standard of ordinary negligence) the
repealing statute had further enacted that the common law standard of ordinary negligence should be applied in the future to all
litigated cases even though the facts had occurred before the statute
repealed the anti-guest statute.14
13. This analogy was suggested by Professor Currie in Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent
Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 258, 290-93 (1961). His analysis
was criticized. See M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: ProfessorCurrie'sRestrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALuF. L. REV. 845 (1961). Subsequently, Currie modified his position. See
Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAws 739 (1963).
14. The retroactive application of statutes has traditionally been regarded as undesirable
by many American lawyers and judges. See Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6
TEXAS L. Rv. 409 (1928); Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation:A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MiNN. L. REv. 775 (1936). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that in spite of serious objections to retroactivity with respect to the due-process
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Shortly before the repeal of the anti-guest statute, severe injuries had been suffered by Rider, a guest-passenger in Driver's car as
a result of Driver's ordinary negligence in state Red. Both parties
were also domiciled in state Red. Immediately after the enactment
of the repealing statute Rider sued Driver in a state Red court alleging only ordinary negligence.
Rider's counsel relied upon the provision of the repealing statute giving the statute retroactive effect. But Driver's counsel challenged the retroactive application of the repealing statute as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of state Red rejected his argument,
pointing out that in state Red ordinary negligence had never been
legalized. The anti-guest statute had merely conferred a partial
immunity on host-drivers because, when it was enacted in 1928,
many such drivers did not carry liability insurance. Hence the retroactive imposition of liability for ordinary negligence did not deprive
Driver of property without due process of law.
Would the decision of the state Red Supreme Court in the
purely domestic case of Rider v. Driver have supported the contention, in the First Guest v. Host hypothetical choice case, that the
state Red common law standard should be "retroactively" enforced
against Host? Of course not. Certain important conditions supporting the retroactive application of state Red's stricter common law
standard in the purely domestic case of Rider v. Driver were totally
absent from the First Guest v. Host hypothetical choice case.
First,Rider and Driver were both citizens of state Red, not only
when their accident occurred there, but also when the state Red
legislature decided that host drivers (such as Driver) guilty of ordiclause, mitigating circumstances may exist in a particular case which would make a retroactive statute a desirable piece of legislation. The opinions of the Court consistently reflect
the view that the only unconstitutional retroactive statutes are those which, upon balancing
the considerations on both sides, are felt to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902). For an extensive
discussion of the various factors considered by the court in determining the constitutionality
of retroactive statutes, see Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 692 (1960). Hochman suggests that the three major
factors are: ". . . the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute, the
extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted pre-enactment right, and the
nature of the right which the statute alters." Id. at 697.
The possibility of retroactive application of an ordinary negligence standard to determine
the driver's liability for injury suffered by a guest prior to the repeal of an anti-guest statute
is refleqte4 in the case of Cummings v. Morez, 42 Cal.App. 3d 66, 116 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1974).
There the California Court of Appeal retroactively applied the decision of the Supreme Court
of California in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973), in which
the California anti-guest statute was invalidated as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
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nary negligence, should no longer enjoy the indefensible and discriminatory benefit provided by the anti-guest statute. As a citizen
of state Red at both material times Driver was clearly subject to its
legislative authority with respect to his conduct there, before or
after the enactment of the repealing statute. On the other hand,
Guest and Host were both citizens of state Blue when the state Red
legislature decided to terminate the partial exemption from liability
that it had previously conferred on host-drivers. If state Red's statute had been applied to the Guest-Host litigation it would not have
been merely applied "retroactively," it would have been applied to
a case wherein neither the parties nor the facts had any contact with
state Red when those facts occurred.
Second, the only factual contact with state Red at the time of
the litigationwas Guest's domicile in that state established after all
liability-vesting, operative facts had occurred outside that state.
This contact had been created by the unilateral decision of one
party only, Guest. Third, when, in the Rider-Driver case, the State
Red court decided to enforce the post-accident repealing statute
that retroactively brought into force the stricter common law standard of ordinary negligence, the court merely displaces, in a purely
domestic case, the previously prevailing state Red exemption for
Host drivers. But, had that court "retroactively" applied state
Red's strict common law standard in the first Guest-Host example
(because Guest had moved to state Red) it would have displaced the
anti-guest statute of state Blue, which at the time the accident
occurred, was the only state having any contact with the case. Because, when the Guest-Host accident occurred, state Blue was the
only state with which the parties and the facts had any contact, the
displacement of Blue's anti-guest statute might well have constituted a denial of full faith and credit to its "public acts."
In short, if in the first hypothetical Guest-Host case, defendant's counsel had contended that the application of the state Red
common law negligence standard would be unconstitutional, the
state Red prior decision that the negligence standard should be
retroactively enforced in a purely domestic case would not have
effectively answered that contention. The issue of retroactivity of
the negligence standard in a purely domestic Case and the issue of
enforcing that standard as the law of a post-transaction domicile,
in a choice-of-law case, are two entirely different issues 5
15. For other criticism of Brainerd Currie's suggested analogy, see M. Traynor, supra
note 13, at 868.
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Having eliminated the red-herring issue of domestic retroactivity, we are now in a position to consider whether the application of
the law of one party's post-transaction domicile for his benefit might
be regarded as denial of full faith and credit to the law of the only
state previously concerned with the transaction.
III.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,'" a 1936
unanimous Supreme Court decision, could be construed as a clear
indication that the application of state Red's pertinent rule in our
first hypothetical case would be vulnerable to attack as a denial of
full faith and credit to the anti-guest statute of state Blue. In Yates'
case the insurance company issued a policy insuring his life, relying
upon an application containing false answers to questions concerning his health and recent medical advice. Less than a month after
the policy was issued Yates died of cancer. Prior to that time Yates
and his wife, the sole beneficiary, were both domiciled in New York
where the policy was applied for and delivered. Under the New York
statutes, as construed by New York courts, the insured was solely
responsible for the truth of statements in the application that had
been signed by him.17 A copy of the application had been delivered
to him as part of his policy. Even if he had stated true answers
which the agent failed to record correctly (a most unlikely event)",
the policy would be void for material false representations.
After Yates' death, his widow-beneficiary established her domicile in Georgia and sued the insurance company there for the full
face value of the policy. At the trial, the company's proof of the New
York law and of the falsity of the written answers in the application
was not disputed. Nevertheless, the trial judge let the case go to the
jury with instructions completely inconsistent with the law of New
York. The jury found a valid contract of insurance; a judgment for
the widow-beneficiary was sustained by two higher Georgia courts. 9
16. 299 U.S. 178 (1936).

17. Reference to the fact that Yates signed the policy does not appear in the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court, but may be found in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Gilbert of the Georgia Supreme Court in 182 Ga. 213, 221, 185 S.E. at 273 (1936).

18. If an agent were found to have unilaterally falsified an insurance application, which
had been truthfully completed by the applicant, he would undoubtedly lose both his job and
any prospects he might have for a career in the insurance business. It is highly unlikely that

an agent would risk such a loss for the relatively small commission he would earn on the sale
of a policy.
19. 50 Ga.App. 619, 179 S.E. 239 (1935); 185 Ga. 213, 185 S.E. 268 (1936).
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The Georgia courts contended that they were not denying full
faith and credit to New York's public acts; they were merely following local rules of procedure. 0 Under the system of territorial, stateselecting principles then in vogue, an extravagant labelling of forum
law as "procedural" or "remedial" usually indicated an unstated
opinion of the judges that, because one or more of the parties was
domiciled in the forum state, its pertinent rules should prevail
rather than those that the state-selecting principles would have
chosen. Presumably, then, the Georgia judges believed that Georgia's rules concerning false statements in insurance applications
should prevail over New York's rules because the widow-beneficiary
was domiciled in Georgia at the time when she brought her suit.
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis devoted most of
his criticism of the Georgia Supreme Court's reasoning to demolishing the pretext that only procedural issues were involved. Only
briefly did he touch on the possibility that a contact with Georgia,
the widow's belated state of domicile, might have brought the case
within the range of its domestic rules and policies.
In respect to the accrual of the right asserted under the contract, or liability denied, there was no occurrence,
nothing done,
21
to which the law of Georgia could apply.
One could wish that Mr. Justice Brandeis had seen fit to add a
few words explaining why the domicile acquired by the widowbeneficiary after her husband's death was not "an occurrence...
to which the law of Georgia could apply." Be that as it may, the
Court's decision upon the facts stated in the opinion clearly supports the interpretation that after the material false statements in
the insured's signed application had prevented the making of a
contract under New York law, the subsequent acquisition by the
widow of a Georgia domicile did not give that state a sufficient
concern in the matter to justify the displacement of the law of New
York.
Some Supreme Court cases, subsequent in time to the Yates
case, indicate that a state may always enforce its own law and policy
in its own courts in a case whose factual contacts bring it within the
legitimate scope of that law and policy. 22 Thus a highly abstract
20. It should be noted that in the Supreme Court of Georgia, two of five judges dissented,
stating that the issue was not one of procedure and that the law of New York should govern.
See dissenting opinion of Justice Gilbert in 182 Ga. 221, 185 S.E. at 273.
21. 299 U.S. at 182.
22. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Carroll v.
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argument could be made that because, at the time of suit, Georgia
had some concern for the widow's welfare, these later decisions of
the Supreme Court have, in effect, overruled the Yates case. But
only one of these later decisions involved a post-transaction change
of domicile and (as will be demonstrated) the divergent laws and
policies of that case were very different from those of the Yates
2
case.m
In any event, in the present climate of choice-of-law doctrine,
it seems unlikely that any state court (having adopted state policy
analysis) and finding itself in the position of the Georgia court in
the Yates case, would feel strongly inclined to apply its own domestic law. State policy analysis has encouraged judges to consider and
compare the effects of each choice they could make between conflicting policies. in choice-in-law cases in much the same way that
they do in domestic cases. When judges realize that the facts of the
case before them bring it within the legitimate range of another
state's law and policy (different from their own) they are usually
anxious to find some rational technique of reconciliation. The circumstance of a post-transaction change of domicile will frequently
(though not invariably) be regarded as a convincing reason for preferring the law and policy of the only state concerned with the case
before the change of domicile occurred.

IV.
The facts of the Yates case suggest a variation that is not unusual in contract cases involving a post-transaction change of domicile; the change occurs after the acts constituting the formation
(real or alleged) of the contract but before the occurrence of significant events giving rise to a duty of performance. Specifically, suppose that in a hypothetical case (the facts being otherwise the same
as those of the Yates case), Mr. and Mrs. Yates had both moved to
Georgia and acquired domiciles there before his death. Thus, when
he died, he too was a citizen of Georgia.
For those who believe that choice-of-law problems can be felicitously resolved by applying the law of the state having the greatest
number of factual contacts, the argument for applying Georgia law
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). A discussion of these two cases with respect to the proposition
stated can be found in B. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interestsand the JudicialFunction,in SELEcTcEn EssAYs ON ThE CONmcr OF LAWS 188 (1963).
23. See Clay v. Sun Life Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), discussed in part VII of
this essay, infra.
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will doubtless seem well-nigh irresistible; the liability-creating
event, the death of Yates, occurred in Georgia at a time when both
the insured and his beneficiary were domiciled there. Hence, the
widow's loss of economic, moral and psychological support also occurred in Georgia. Moreover, the defendant insurance company
was, at all material times, selling insurance in Georgia and enjoying
the protection of its government. But if we are realistically discussing a Georgia policy that would permit a sympathetic jury to enforce an alleged insurance "contract" (void for false representations
under New York law) in order to help a Georgia widow, what difference does it make whether her husband died in New York or in New
Jersey or in Australia? The fact of his death is material; the place
is immaterial.
A plausible argument could be made, in our variation of the
Yates case, that when Mr. Yates became a citizen of Georgia, he
brought himself within the policy scope of Georgia's easygoing and
ambivalent rule permitting a jury to validate his insurance
"contract" even though he had obtained it by signing an application
containing statements he knew to be false. But, apart from this very
temporary concern that Georgia could be said to have had for Mr.
Yates' hope that his alleged "policy" (obtained in the dubious manner aforesaid) would be sustained in law, the actual case and our
hypothetical variation appear to be indistinguishable. While recognizing a degree of conflict between the laws and policies of Georgia
and New York, a modern court, committed to state interest analysis, would be unlikely to find in the Yates' unilateral change of
domicile a persuasive rationale for overriding the law of New York. 24
The foregoing suggestion finds support in the real change-ofdomicile case, Bernkrant v. Fowler, a 1961 unanimous decision of
the Supreme Court of California, with opinion by Mr. Justice Traynor.2 In Bernkrant v. Fowler, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, were
at all times domiciled in Nevada. They sued the estate of John
Granrud, domiciled at the time of his death in California, to enforce
his oralpromise to cancel, by his will, their debt to him, secured by
a second trust deed on the John Granrud garden apartments in
Nevada. (At an earlier date Granrud had owned the apartments,
but later sold them to the plaintiffs). At the time of his oral
"testamentary" promise, Granrud held a second trust deed on the
24. Granting that a true conflict exists, there is a large degree of unfairness in allowing
the insureds' move to another state to breathe life into an otherwise void policy.
25. 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266 (1961).
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apartments for approximately $24,500. He wanted the Bernkrants
to refinance his and another trust deed on the property in such a
way that he would receive about $13,000 in ready cash. He would
also receive a newly executed second trust deed on the apartment
building for a lesser sum. As to the debt secured by this trust deed,
Grandrud gave his oral promise that by his will he would cancel any
debt owing to him by the Bernkrants at the time of his death. At a
cost of $800, the Bernkrants arranged the refinancing so that Granrud received $13,140 in cash. When Granrud died eighteen months
later, the plaintiffs still owed him $6,425 secured by the second trust
deed. His will, admitted to probate in California, made no provision
for cancellation of this debt.
Since Granrud had formerly owned the apartment building,
had retained a security interest in it, and had made his oral testamentary promise in Nevada, the Supreme Court (in the first part
of its opinion) decided the case on the assumption that Granrud had
been domiciled there when he made the promise, but had later
changed his domicile to California.
Only this part of the opinion is relevant to the subject of this
essay. Under the California statute of frauds, testamentary promises, such as Granrud's, were specifically invalidated; Nevada law
merely required that they be clearly proved. Thus, at the time the
contract was made, Nevada had a concern that this contract should
be specifically enforced (if necessary) for the benefit of the Nevada
plaintiffs. Granrud, also domiciled there, could not, at that time,
bring himself within the policy scope of California's statute. Had
the contract's validity been litigated then, only Nevada's law and
policy would have been applicable."
When Granrud acquired a California domicile, however, he
immediately brought himself within the policy-determined scope of
the California statute designed to protect testators' expectations,
concerning the disposition of their estates, against false or grossly
exaggerated claims. In the opinion by Justice Traynor, this interest
of California was clearly recognized. 27 On the other hand, Nevada's
policy of validating the contract for the plaintiffs benefit would not
be changed by Granrud's departure; it would thus come into conflict
with California's newly-relevant statutory policy designed to protect
Granrud's estate from dubious claims. Justice Traynor resolved this
26. See Cavers, Oral Contracts to Provide by Will and the Choice-of-Law Process:Some
Notes on Bernkrant, in ESSAYS FOR AusTiN WAKcmAN Scorr 60-61 (R. Pound, E. Griswold &

A. Sutherland eds. 1964).
27. 55 Cal.2d at 594, 360 P.2d at 909.
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very real conflict by stressing the unfairness to the plaintiffs of
allowing California law to displace that of Nevada on the basis of
Granrud's unilateral decision to move to California.
"If Granrud was a resident of Nevada at the time the contract
was made, the California statute of frauds, in the absence of plain
legislative direction to the contrary, could not reasonably be interpreted as applying to the contract, even though Granrud subsequently moved to California and died here. . . .The basic policy
of upholding the expectations of the parties by enforcing contracts
valid under the only law apparently applicable would preclude an
interpretation of our statute of frauds that would make it apply to
and thus invalidate the contract because Granrud moved to
California and died here. 2 8 (emphasis added)
It is very important to note that the death of Granrud in California, like the hypothetical death of Mr. Yates in Georgia, added
nothing to the claim that California's invalidating statute should be
applied. Regardless of where Granrud died, that claim rested solely
upon the fact that he had become a California citizen, a person
whom the statute was plainly meant to protect. The fact of his death
was important because it brought him and his property within the
terms and policy of the statute; the place of his death was not.

V.
State policy analysis has revealed the existence of at least two
general types of false-conflict cases. In the simpler type (represented
by the second hypothetical example in Part I and analdgous real
cases there cited), one state has a strong concern that its law and
policy should prevail; the other state has little or no concern at all.
In the second and sometimes more complex type of false-conflict
case, neither state appears to have a strong or even a significant
concern (in the usual sense) that its law should be applied. The
most obvious solution suggested by such a fact-law pattern would
be to dismiss the plaintiff's action, not because one state had a
significant interest in protecting the defendant, but because the
facts of the case do not fall within the policy-determined range of
either state's law.
Such a result is by no means absurd. Usually, in such cases, the
domestic law of the plaintiffs domicile would have given him no
cause of action and, although there are contacts with another state,
those contacts do not place the case within the policy range of the
28. Id. at 594-595, 360 P.2d at 909-910.

No. 2]

Effect of New Domicile on Choice of Law

other state's pertinent rules. In Erwin v. Thomas,2" for example, the
state of Washington was shown to have adhered to the traditional
common law doctrine that, although a husband had a cause of action against a tortfeasor who had injured his wife for the loss of her
companionship and sexual lovemaking (euphemistically designated
as the husband's right to "consortium"), a wife had no analogous
claim against a tortfeasor who had injured her husband, even
though the injury had rendered him impotent. Oregon, on the other
hand, had enacted a statute in 1941, conferring such a cause of
action upon the wife.
The facts that brought the case before the Supreme Court of
Oregon in 1973 were'these: Erwin, domiciled with his wife Ruby in
Washington, was severely injured there by the alleged negligence of
Thomas, domiciled in Oregon. Ruby Erwin brought suit in the Oregon state courts against Thomas and his employer, an Oregon corporation, to recover damages for the loss of her husband's
"consortium." On demurrer to the complaint, the judge of first
instance held that Ruby Erwin was not entitled to the benefits
conferred by the Oregon statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Oregon recognized the rationality and propriety of the lower court's
decision in these words: " . . . . it is stretching the imagination
more than a trifle to conceive that the Oregon legislature was concerned about the rights of all the nonresidentmarried women ....
'3°
whose husbands would be injured outside of the state of Oregon.
Following this line of reasoning, the court might well have held that
since the Oregon consortium statute did not specifically purport to
benefit non-resident women whose husbands had been injured
outside that state, Ruby Erwin's suit should be dismissed.
In the closing passages of its opinion, however, the court executed a complete turn-around and decided (by a majority) to confer
upon Ruby Erwin the benefits of Oregon's consortium statute, thus
authorizing the trial court to award her damages. The court's reasons were simplistic, mechanical and unconvincing, 3 but the decision was surely just as rational and fair as a decision to dismiss Ruby
Erwin's suit would have been. In their final decision, the majority
took an altruistic approach to the case, noting that, "Washington
policy cannot be offended if the court of another state affords rights
to a Washington woman which Washington does not afford, so long
29. 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
30. 264 Or. at 458-459, 506 P.2d at 496.
31. See Hancock, Policy Controlled State Interest Analysis in Choice of Law, Measure
of Damages, Tort Cases, 26 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 799, 814-819 (1977).
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as a Washington defendant is not required to respond.""2 As for the
Oregon defendants, they were merely being required to pay the
same damages that they would have paid had they injured the
husband of an Oregon woman. The Oregon court was presumably
reluctant to discriminate against Ruby Erwin, even though her case
fell outside the normal range of Oregon policy.
Having recognized that there can be false conflict cases in
which the court may fairly and rationally adopt either of two alternative lines of reasoning, each leading to a different result, we now
return to the major problem of this essay. Suppose that after Erwin
was injured in Washington, he and his wife Ruby moved to Oregon
and became domiciled there before Ruby's suit for consortium damages was filed. This change of domicile, if taken into account by the
Oregon judges, would obviously give Oregon a strong interest (of the
usual kind) in having its law and policy applied for the benefit of
its new citizen, Ruby Erwin. The primary issue, however, would be
whether, as against the Oregon defendants, the Erwins' unilateral
change of domicile could fairly be allowed to affect the decision.
The cases discussed in Parts I through IV of this article are not
very helpful because, in those cases, the unilateral change of domicile itself created a true conflict problem. In our supposed variation
of Erwin v. Thomas, there is no conflict at all between the Washington and Oregon rules.
Erwin v. Thomas and analogous false-conflict cases have two
distinctive characteristics. First, there is absolutely no conflict between the pertinent rule of the forum and that of any other state.
Second, the court may adopt either of two equally fair and rational
lines of reasoning, although they lead to different results. Under
these circumstances, it is submitted that in our hypothetical case,
the court should take into account a change of domicile such as that
supposedly made by Ruby Erwin and her husband. No conflict is
thereby created. Oregon, it is true, acquires a concern (in the usual
sense) that its law and policy should be enforced for the benefit of
its new citizen, Ruby Erwin. But Washington law remains totally
neutral. As to the defendants, the court had ample grounds for
applying Oregon law (to their disadvantage) even if the Erwins had
not unilaterally changed their domicile to Oregon.

VI.
In the cases (real or hypothetical) previously considered in
32. 506 P.2d at 496.
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parts I through IV, we have begun with a purely domestic problem
or a simple choice-of-law prioblem where the laws and policies of the
connected states were not in conflict. But when one party thereafter
changed his domicile to a state that previously had no concern with
the controversy, the situation was drastically altered. That state,
because of the change of domicile, acquired a concern that its law
and policy be enforced for the benefit of its new domiciliary.
We shall now consider the type of case in which a true conflict
existed before any change of domicile occurred. Assume, as in Part
I, that state Blue had an anti-guest statute, but state Red had none.
Guest and Host were both domiciled in state Blue. But in state Red,
Guest, riding as a passenger in Host's car, was severely injured by
Host's negligent driving. Following long settled arrangements made
before his injury, Guest subsequently acquired a domicile in state
Red and sued Host in that state.
Prior to the change of domicile, the fact-law pattern was a
familiar one that produced an obvious true conflict problem." State
Blue had a clear concern that Host should be protected from the
unpleasant aspects of litigation and the risk of an adverse judgment
resulting in higher future insurance premiums. State Red had a
concern, not only for its potential therapeutic creditors, but also
because its courts were unwilling to recognize any exemption from
its rule that negligent driving on its highways must result in civil
liability.
The issue of principal importance for this essay is the effect to
be given to Guest's change of domicile. A full examination of the
case would require the court, at least as a preliminary to further
analysis, to recognize that state Red had a concern that its rule
should be applied to insure compensation for the benefit of its new
citizen, Guest, and his family. Although any additional consideration given to Guest because of his unilateral change of domicile
must be, to some extent, unfair to Host, in this case, unlike the cases
previously considered, the court cannot resolve the true conflict
problem by excluding the effects of Guest's change of domicile from
all consideration. A true-conflict problem was inherent in the case
before the change of domicile occurred; the court must turn elsewhere for a means of resolving the conflict.
It is submitted that when one party's change of domicile is not
the sole source and cause of a true-conflict problem, the policy
implications of that change of domicile may generally be given such
33. See, e.g., Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W. 2d 579 (1968); Milkovich v.
Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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consideration and effect as judges believe they deserve in the light
of the policies involved. Of course, judges should take into account
the unfairness to the non-changing party, but they should also bear
in mind that that change of domicile will not be the sole ground for
applying the law of the new domicile (here, state Red). Therefore,
the concern of state Red for its new citizen, Guest, as embodied in
its pertinent rule of law, should not be entirely excluded from the
ultimate decision.
The foregoing suggestion finds support in Haines v. MidCentury Insurance Co., decided in 1970 by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. 4 Sara Haines had sued her husband and his insurer for
personal injury damages sustained by her while riding in an automobile driven by him in Wisconsin. Though both husband and wife
were domiciled in Minnesota when the accident occurred, defendants' counsel conceded that the issue of tort liability should be
determined by Wisconsin law under which Mr. Haines would be
liable fbr ordinary negligence. The sole issue, raised by a pre-trial
motion for summary judgment for the insurer, was the validity of a
clause in the insurance policy excluding from its coverage liability
of the insured for bodily injury to a member of his household. A
Wisconsin statute declared such clauses unlawful and void; Minnesota judge-made law had held them to be enforceable.
Adopting the same state policy analysis it had used in earlier
choice-of-law tort cases, the court treated the following additional
facts as significant: Mr. Haines was employed at all material times
in the city of La Crosse, Wisconsin, although until after the accident, he was domiciled in La Crescente, Minnesota, "a bedroom
suburb almost totally dependent upon La Crosse for its existence.""
Mr. Haines carried on negotiations for the policy in La Crosse, Wisconsin, and the policy was delivered to him at the insurer's office
in that city. Finally, and most important for this essay, the plaintiffs complaint alleged that at the time when she commenced her
action she was domiciled in La Crosse, Wisconsin.
The court conceded that the fact of the wife and husband having a common domicile in Minnesota at the time of the accident
supported the argument that Minnesota's rule should be applied.
On the other hand, the court stated: "Wisconsin . . . would have
an interest in seeing that its policy of protecting injured parties,
regardless of their relationship to negligent drivers, would be given
34. 47 Wis.2d 442, 177 N.W. 2d 328 (1970).
35. Id. at 449, 177 N.W. 2d at 332.
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effect in insurance contracts negotiated and entered into in this
state.""5
What significance, if any, did the court attribute to Sara
Haines' alleged change of domicile after she had been injured? On
this issue, the court stated:
However, this [the argument for applying the Minnesota decisional rule because the domicile of the parties at the time of the
accident was Minnesota] is offset by the fact that the complaint
alleges that the plaintiff at the time of the commencement of this
action was a resident of La Crosse, Wisconsin. In such a situation,
Wisconsin's policy of not recognizing the family exclusion clause
becomes more important. Any fear that a plaintiff would purposefully move to this state in order to take advantage of Wisconsin's
policy of nonrecognition of family-exclusion clauses is, for the most
part, unfounded. It is doubtful that anyone would move from one
state to another merely to take advantage of the latter's allegedly
more favorable policies.37 (Emphasis on not is added.)
Having concluded that it was presented with a true-conflict
case, the court chose to enforce the Wisconsin statute on the ground
that, compared with Minnesota's judge-made rule sustaining the
validity of family-exclusion clauses, the Wisconsin statute should be
regarded as "the better rule of law."3 In support of this conclusion,
the court stated: "The argument that Wisconsin has the better rule
36. Id. at 450, 177 N.W.2d at 332. The defendant insurer had an office in La Crosse,
Wisconsin; presumably it was also licensed to sell insurance in that state. It could thus be
argued that, as to policies sold in Wisconsin, it had subjected itself to Wisconsin's law
invalidating certain policy clauses.
An even stronger argument for applying Wisconsin law could have been based on the fact
that Wisconsin's law concededly imposed liability in tort upon the insured defendant, Mr.
Harris. In the case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954),
the plaintiff, domiciled in Louisiana, brought a direct action against the defendant insurer
as permitted by Louisiana law, alleging injuries from a cosmetic product manufactured
outside Louisiana. The injuries were suffered by her in Louisiana. The insurer, though carrying on business in Louisiana, contended that the liability insurance contract which prohibited
such direct actions could not be affected by Louisiana law because it was made outside
Louisiana and the manufacturer did not carry on business in Louisiana. Speaking for the
Supreme Court, Mr. Jusice Black rejected this contention in these words:
"Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are more likely to be Louisiana residents,
and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them . .

.

.Louisiana has mani-

fested its natural interest in the injured by providing remedies for recovery of
damages. It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are designed to
assure ultimate payment of such damages." Id. at 72.
The court sustained the constitutionality of the Louisiana direct action law, overriding
the terms of the insurance contract.
37. 47 Wis.2d at 450, 177 N.W.2d at 332.
38. Id. at 451, 177 N.W.2d at 333.
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of law received tacit confirmation by the Minnesota legislature
when it enacted the statute [after Sara Haines was injured] invalidating the family exclusion
clause. Thus Minnesota law is now the
39
same as Wisconsin."
VII.

At this point in the discussion, the well-known case of Clay v.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.'" may be appropriately considered.
Though it has many features in common with the cases (real or
hypothetical) previously discussed, it is significantly different in
certain respects, most particularly with regard to the policies and
effects of the domestic rules of law involved.
In 1952, Clay, while domiciled in Illinois, purchased from the
insurer-defendant a policy described as "Personal Property Floater
Policy (World Wide)." It insured his moveable personal property,
wherever situated, against all risks of loss or damage for a period of
three years. The defendant insurer was a British corporation licensed to do business in Illinois, Florida and nine other states. A few
months after purchasing the policy, Clay moved to Florida and
established his domicile there. On February 1, 1955, Clay reported
to the insurer the loss of moveable property located in Florida that
became the subject matter of the lawsuit. Two months later, the
insurer denied liability on the ground that the loss was due to the
willful injury or misappropriation of the property by Clay's wife, a
loss allegedly not covered by the policy.41 More than two years after
discovery of the loss, Clay brought suit against the insurer in a
Florida federal court. The policy contained a time-of-suit clause
(not unusual in insurance policies) providing that suit on any claim
for loss must be brought within twelve months after the discovery
of the loss.
As long ago as 1913, the Florida legislature had enacted the
following statute to prevent insurance companies and others from
evading the Florida Statute of Limitations.
All provisions and stipulations contained in any contract whatever entered into after May 26, 1913, fixing the period of time in
39. Id.
40. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
41. When the case was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals to ascertain the Florida law on this point, the Supreme Court of Florida

replied that under Florida law the insurer was liable for the destruction or misappropriation
of property by Clay's wife. This decision completely removed the issue from the case. See Sun
Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
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which suits may be instituted under any such contract. . . at a
period of time less than that provided by the statute of limitations
of this state, are hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy
of this state, and to be illegal and void. No court in this state shall
give effect to any provision or stipulation of the character men42
tioned in this section.
In Illinois, where Clay had been domiciled when he purchased his
policy, the courts had sustained the validity of similar time-of-suit
clauses. Had the loss occurred and the suit been filed in Illinois
before Clay moved to Florida, a suit by Clay upon the policy would
have been subject to the time-of-suit clause.
Before discussing this fascinating case on its merits, the curious
circumstance should be noted that the case never received, from
either the federal courts or the Supreme Court of Florida, the penetrating and comprehensive analysis that it deserved. Such an analysis would necessarily have included a careful examination of the
policies of the pertinent Illinois and Florida rules, an inquiry as to
whether there was a true conflict between them and, if so, a consideration of how that c6nflict might be resolved. The federal district
judge enforced the Florida statute and upheld Clay's claim, but his
reasons for doing so have never been published. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that enforcement
of the Florida statute was unconstitutional. 43 The United States
Supreme Court (by a majority) directed the Court of Appeals to ask
the Supreme Court of Florida (through Florida's statutory certification procedure) whether it would construe the Florida statute as
extending to the facts of the Clay case." That court, having held
that the questions put to it did not require it to consider constitutional limitations, replied that Florida state courts should enforce
the statute in all cases over which they had jurisdiction.4 5 (So much
for thoughtful examination of the policies of Illinois law!)
The Court of Appeals, adhering to its previous opinion," was
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. (1960) §§ 95.03, 95.11 (3). California attorneys may be interested to
note that California, unlike Florida, has no statute invalidating time-of-suit clauses in insurance contracts. An insurer may by contract limit the time within which suit may be brought
so as to provide a shorter time than that allowed by general law. Genuser v. Ocean Accid. &
Guarantee Corp., 57 Cal.App.2d 979, 135 P.2d 670 (1943). Such contract provisions have been
upheld as valid where the court finds them to be reasonable. As between insurer and insured,
one year has been found to be reasonable. Olds v. General Acci. Fire & Assur. Corp., 67
Cal.App.2d 812, 155 P.2d 676 (1945).
43. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
44. Clay v. Sun Ins., Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
45. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
46. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v.Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963).
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reversed by the Supreme Court.4 7 For a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Douglas delivered a short opinion holding that Florida had
sufficient contacts and concerns to satisfy the constitutional limitations upon its power to apply its domestic law.
Thus, with relatively little assistance from the judges who participated in this lengthy litigation, we embark upon an examination
of the policy range of the Florida statute, to be followed by a similar
examination of the Illinois case law. Every law student knows that
one purpose of a statute of limitations (or other statutory time-ofsuit limitation) is to protect defendants from claims based on "stale
testimony" at a late date when important defensive testimony or
documents may no longer be available. What is often overlooked by
commentators and courts is that a potential plaintiff, on the other
hand, needs time in which to decide whether to consult a lawyer and
he, having been consulted, needs time to .investigate the case and
advise his client. Hence, such statutes can quite appropriately be
construed as fixing the necessary time to which a plaintiff and his
lawyer are entitled in order to make their investigations and decisions. The Florida legislature decided, in 1913, to tell the Florida
judges in no uncertain terms, that this policy of the Florida statute
of limitations must not be overlooked.
It should be noted that the 1913 Florida statute was not designed merely to limit the power of insurance companies to force a
particular kind of clause upon the buyers of a necessary commodity.
As its language shows, the statute's broad purpose was to prohibit
and invalidate all contracts that would deny to any person access
to Florida courts by fixing a time for suit shorter than that established by the laws of Florida. Who were the intended beneficiaries
of this strongly-worded statute? Citizens of Florida and aliens domiciled there would certainly be the subjects of legislative concern.
When the loss of Clay's property occurred, Clay was a member of
this protected group.
A second powerful argument justifying the application of Florida's statute rested upon the circumstance that Clay's property was
destroyed or misappropriated in Florida. In a seemingly contrary
vein, the point has been emphasized in this essay that, had Mr.
Yates died in Georgia, the occurrence of his death in that state
would have added nothing to its concern that its law should be
applied. A similar poiiit was made concerning the death of John
8 in
Granrud (the testamentary promisor of Bernkrant v. Fowler)"
47. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
48. 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266 (1961).
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California. But the destruction or misappropriation of Clay's property was almost certainly illegal and tortious under the law of Florida. Florida would therefore have a strong and well-recognized concern 4" that its law, compensating Clay, should be applied against
the tortfeasor. Moreover, since compensation had, in Clay's case,
been promised by an insurer doing business in Florida, that state
would also have a strong concern that its statute, protecting.Clay's
claim against time-of-suit clauses, should be applied. Even if Clay
had remained domiciled in Illinois, at the time his property was
destroyed or misappropriated in Florida,a Florida court would have
had a strong, rational ground for enforcing the Florida statute invalidating the time-of-suit clause.
The most important (though generally overlooked) factor in the
Clay case was the relatively insignificant concern of Illinois for the
application of its judge-made domestic rule validating time-of-suit
clauses. True, the factual contacts with Illinois were precisely those
of the Yates case 0 with New York: A citizen of Illinois had purchased insurance from a multi-state corporation doing business in
Illinois, Florida and elsewhere. But the sources and policies of the
New York and Illinois laws were very different. In the Yates case,
the New York legislators had enacted a statute that (as construed
by their highest state court) invalidated all life insurance contracts
procured by written misrepresentations in an application signed by
the insured. It would have been absurd even to suggest that, given
the aforesaid contacts with the State of New York, the statute was
not intended to be applied if an insurance contract, so obtained, was
sued upon in another state.
The validity of a time-of-suit clause, however, is primarily the
concern of the state where the suit has been brought because the
clause attempts to deny to one party access to the courts of that
state, thereby curtailing their "jurisdiction." Perhaps, if the facts
and the litigation have only an insignificant jurisdictional contact
with the state of suit (e.g., jurisdiction obtained by service on the
defendant while passing through the state or by attaching a debt
owed to him by a person subject to suit there), its courts ought to
recognize a time-of-suit clause, binding upon the parties under the
law of their common domicile or place of business. But in Clay's
case, Florida had jurisdiction over the defendant insurer because
the insurer was doing business in Florida. Moreover, the tortious
49. See the Watson case cited and discussed in note 36, supra;see alsoM. Traynor, supra
note 13, at 870.
50. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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destruction or misappropriation of Clay's property in Florida provided an additional justification for a Florida court to exercise its
jurisdiction and to apply its law.
Unlike the New York statute in the Yates case, the Illinois
decisional rule was not concerned with false representations making
an alleged "contract" void. Rather, the Illinois rule dealt with a
single clause, in an otherwise valid contract, that would not take
effect until twelve months after a loss had occurred, at which time
the rule, if valid, would bar a suit on the contract.
At the time when the suit was brought in Florida, the case had
no significant contacts with Illinois except that the defendant, a
multistate corporation, was doing business there (as well as in Florida and nine other states). The Illinois legislature had neither invalidated nor supported time-of-suit clauses. In an era when opinion
in the legal profession tended to favor freedom of contract, arid in
the absence of legislative guidance, the Illinois courts had sustained
the validity of time-of-suit clauses that denied to Illinois citizens
access to Illinois courts." There was nothing whatever in those permissive precedents to suggest that any policy of Illinois decisional
law would have favored the denial of access to the courts of a sisterstate, by a citizen of that state, through the enforcement of a timeof-suit clause for the benefit of a multistate corporation doing business in both states. As Mr. Justice Black observed (in his dissenting
opinion):
There are illinois cases indicating that the contractual provision
shortening the Illinois State statute of limitations might be treated
as valid in a court of that State. There are no cases, however,
indicating that Illinois-wanted to project its law into the State of
Floridaso as to nullify a Florida law invalidating such contractual
provisions in Florida courts.2 (Emphasis added by author.)
Considering the specific policy of the Florida statute, namely,
protecting the right of access to Florida courts, considering that this
statute took effect only after a loss had occurred in Florida to a
Florida citizen, considering that the Illinois cases did not indicate
"that Illinois wanted to project its law into the State of Florida so
as to nullify a Florida law" (invalidating time-of-suit clauses in
Florida courts), and considering that when the Florida statute was
enforced, the sole Illinois contact was that of a multistate corpora51. See Trichelle v. Sherman & Ellis, Inc., 259 Ill.
App. 346 (1930); Hartzell v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 163 Ill.App. 221 (1911).
52. 363 U.S. at 216-217.
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tion doing business in Illinois, Florida and nine other states, it is
submitted that there was no reason to assume that Illinois had
declared any policy that would extend to the Clay case in a Florida
court. In other words, the pertinent rules of the two states, though
different, were not in conflict with one another.
What light does the foregoing analysis of the Clay case shed
upon the major problem of this essay? Looking backward over the
cases previously considered, the Clay case resembles the Haines
case in that, even if no change of domicile had occurred, Florida
(like Wisconsin) would still have had a strong concern for the application of its law because Clay's property had been destroyed or
misappropriated there. As in the Wisconsin case, the final opinion
of the Supreme Court appears to be considering Clay's Florida citizenship as a basis for that state's interest in the application of its
law. Our hypothetical example, based on Erwin v. Thomas,53 is like

the Clay case because Illinois had no concern that its rule should
be applied, just as Washington had no concern that its rule should
be applied. The position of Florida in relation to Clay was very
similar to that of Oregon in relation to Ruby Erwin; once the new
domiciliary had moved to the new domicile (Oregon, Florida), a
strong concern (in the usual sense) arose-and the other state
(Washington, Illinois) had no contrary concern that its pertinent
rule should prevail.
But Clay v. Sun Life Insurance Office nevertheless remains
unique. Its special characteristic is the particular policy and effect
of the Florida statute, as directed against the time-of-suit clause it
had declared to be invalid. An economist specializing in insurance
might well have regarded a time-of-suit clause as nothing more than
part of the definition of the risk that the insurer had assumed. But
to Florida legislators, lawyers and judges, such a clause constituted
an indefensible attempt to deprive a citizen (or domiciled alien) of
access to the courts of his own state. Despite its lack of detailed
analysis, the bold opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, confirmed (in the context of the fact-law pattern of the Clay case) by
the unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court, will
stand for some time to come as a complete discreditation of the
older Supreme Court cases, relied upon by the Court of Appeal,54
53. 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).

54. In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon two early
Supreme Court cases: Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), and Hartford Acci. &
Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
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and a challenge to any attempt to enforce time-of-suit clauses in
choice-of-law cases.
VIII.
Brainerd Currie was understandably suspicious of claims based
upon an advantageous post-transaction change of domicile. Yet he
insisted that a contract between a father and mother, releasing the
father from all future claims for their child's support (even though
valid under the law of the three parties common domicile when
made) should be subject to invalidation if the child later acquired
a new domicile. 5 1 It was assumed that in a purely domestic case in
the state of the child's new domicile, the court would have disregarded such a contract as a defense to a claim against the father for
further contributions to the child's support.
Currie demonstrated this proposition with a hypothetical example based on the facts of the notorious New York case of Haag v.
Barnes." He assumed that when an intimate relationship developed
between Dorothy Haag and Robert Barnes, resulting in her pregnancy, both were domiciled in Illinois. An illegitimate child, father
by Barnes, was born there. With each party represented by counsel,
an agreement was signed in Illinois, providing that Barnes should
pay Dorothy the sum of $1,000 for the future maintenance and education of the child, that Barnes should be released from all future
obligations to her or to the child, and that the contract should, "in
all respects, be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of
the state of Illinois. ' 57
After two years, Dorothy changed her domicile (and that of the
child) to New York. About a year later she instituted a support
proceeding against Barnes in the New York courts. Barnes pleaded
the Illinois contract as a complete defense.
Under the then prevailing law of Illinois (in 1961), the father
of a bastard child might compromise his legal liability with the
mother without the approval of a judge, by paying her any sum
exceeding $800. Under New York law, however, such an agreement
of compromise made by the father and mother would be binding
only when a judge had determined that adequate provision had been
made for the child's support.
55. See Currie, SsLscTFn ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 728-739 (1963), in which
Currie discusses the case of Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 44
(1961).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 558, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 67, 175 N.E.2d at 442.
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As compared to the cases (real or hypothetical) previously considered, the fact-law pattern of this hypothetical example seems
clearly unfavorable to the claim of the mother and child. When the
contract was made, exonerating the father from all future liability,
Illinois was the only state with which the parties or the facts had
any connection. Later, the mother, by her own unilateral decision,
established a domicile for herself and her child in New York,. whose
law was much more favorable to them than that of Illinois. Nevertheless, Professor Currie concluded that New York had such a strong
and legitimate concern in compelling the father to make adequate
provision for his child that its interest should prevail over that of
Illinois. In support of his contention he relied upon Justice Stone's
powerful and persuasive dissenting opinion in the controversial case
of Yarborough v. Yarborough.58 There is no need, in this essay, to
quarrel with the majority decision in the Yarborough case. There,
the father's defense against liability for the support of his legitimate
minor child was based not upon a mere agreement, but upon the
judgment of a Georgia court granting a divorce to him and the
child's mother, who had raised the issue of the minor child's future
support by her cross-complaint. The judgment purported to immunize the father from all future liability for the support of his minor
child upon payment to a trustee of $1750, which obligation he had
fulfilled. More than two years after the Georgia court had entered
its decree, at a time when the minor child had become domiciled in
South Carolina, and the sum paid had been exhausted, a court of
that state, on the basis of the child's need as then shown, rendered
a judgment directing further payments for her support by her father.
In the context of Currie's Haag-Barnes hypothetical example,
Mr. Justice Stone's opinion must be read as supporting New York's
concern for the welfare of the minor child domiciled in New York
(an unusually vital concern, superior to that of Illinois, which had
been the common domicile of Haag, Barnes and the child when the
agreement was signed there, and was still the domicile of Barnes
when the support proceedings were brought in New York).
The maintenance and support of children domiciled within a
state, like their education and custody, is a subject in which government itself is deemed to have a peculiar interest and concern.
Their tender years, their inability to provide for themselves, the
importance to the state that its future citizens should be clothed,
58. 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933).
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nourished and suitably educated, are considerations which lead all
civilized countries to assume some control over the maintenance
of minors . . . . In order that children may not become public
charges the duty of maintenance is one imposed primarily upon
the parents. . . . The measure of the duty is the needs of the child
and the ability of the parent to meet those needs at the very time
when performance of the duty is invoked. Hence it is no answer in
such a suit that at some earlier time provision was made for the
child which is no longer available or suitable because of its greater
needs, or because of the increased financial ability of the parent
to provide for them, or that the child may be maintained from
other sources. (Emphasis added by author.)5"
Assuming that we are persuaded by the contention of Justice
Stone, as adopted by Brainerd Currie, how shall we distinguish this
hypothetical case from the cases previously considered? The most
obvious distinguishing factor is that we are here concerned with the
sustenance and welfare of a relatively helpless and dependent minor
child. Even able-bodied and educated adults are protected from
harsh and unconscionable contracts. In a choice-of-law context, of
course, the problem inevitably becomes more complex. The government of Illinois was apparently willing to assume all the expenses
of feeding and clothing a minor child if the father would contribute
$800. But this is a free country in which the mother and her minor
child are entitled to move from state to state. A minor child's need
for maintenance and support will inevitably exist for a considerable
period of time. A choice-of-law doctrine that would require the people of New York to recognize the absurd concession to the father,
apparently granted him by the law of Illinois (then in force), would
be intolerable.

IX.
In the previous eight parts of this essay, our attention has been
confined to the situation in which after the alleged commission of a
tort or making of a contract, one party has changed his domicile to
a state whose pertinent rule of law, if applied, would clearly aid his
cause. We now turn to the totally different and considerably less
complicated situation in which after the alleged occurrence, one
party has changed his domicile to a state whose pertinent rule, if
applied, would be disadvantageous to his cause.
Since there are very few decided cases on this point, we shall
59. Id. at 220-222.
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begin with two simple hypothetical examples.
Assume, as in Part I, that state Blue had an anti-guest statute
and that state Red had none. Guest and host were both domiciled
in state Blue. Guest, while riding in Host's car in state Blue, was
severely injured as a result of Host's ordinary negligence in the
operation of the car. After the accident, Host changed his domicile
from state Blue to state Red. Guest, though still domiciled in state
Blue, brought suit against Host in state Red, alleging a cause of
action against Host under the state Red rule that a host-driver
should be liable for ordinary negligence.
Guest argued that, had he been a citizen of state Red when the
accident occurred, a state Red court would very likely have decided
in his favor. (A number of decisions support this position.)" He
therefore urged the state Red court to adopt an altruistic approach
to this case (similar to that adopted by the Oregon court in Erwin
v. Thomas) and to not discriminate against him merely because
when he was injured by Host in state Blue, he was not a citizen of
state Red. According to Guest, a decision in his favor would not
conflict with any policy of state Blue because that state no longer
had any concern for the application of its anti-guest statute to protect Host. Host had ceased to be a citizen of state Blue before the
suit was filed.
Guest's argument, though superficially plausible, rests upon an
erroneous assumption. When Host was a citizen of state Blue, and
Guest was injured there, that state had a clear concern that Host
should be protected from liability to a guest passenger for his ordinary negligence. Did state Blue cease to have such a concern when
Host changed his domicile to state Red? Of course not. Every state
and nation has a strong concern that, when its citizens or domiciliaries move to another state or nation, they should not, for that
reason, be subjected to a new or increased liability for acts or events
occurring before they left the protection of the government of their
former domicile. Host's change of domicile necessarily subjected
him to the jurisdiction of state Red courts. It was, therefore, the
obligation of those courts to treat Host (a former citizen of state
Blue) with the same consideration that they would expect a state
Blue court to treat a former citizen of state Red who had moved to
state Blue. Such reciprocity or "comity" (as it was formerly called)
60. See, e.g., Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Foster v.
Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Cipolla v.
Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 568, 267 A.2d 854, 857 (1970).
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is one of the oldest recognized policies of choice-of-laws doctrine.
As for Erwin v. Thomas, the notion of reciprocity was totally
irrelevant in that case. Because Washington had no concern whatever for the application of its law to defeat Ruby Erwin's claim to
consortium damages, Oregon was free to adopt an altruistic policy,
at the expense of the Oregon defendants, if it chose to do so. In our
hypothetical case, however, the state Red court was not free to
subvert the law and policy of state Blue in a situation where all
states have a strong common interest in fair treatment of those
persons who choose to change, their domiciles. Moreover, were the
state Red court to adopt Guest's argument, it would in effect be
telling Host something very curious; it would be telling Host that
he ought to have remained in state Blue until the litigation was
completed or settled or barred by the statute of limitations. Would
this not have been absurd? When a choice of law doctrine attempts
to penalize a person for changing his domicile, there is surely something seriously wrong with it.
Suppose that both Host and Guest had moved to state Red
after their accident. Those who believe that fair and rational results
can be reached by "grouping of contacts" (i.e., counting up contacts
without regard to their importance in relation to the policies of the
domestic laws involved) may conclude that this would be a stronger
case for Guest than the preceding example. It would, of course,
create a true conflict problem similar to the first hypothetical example of Part I (where Guest alone after injury in state Blue moved
from state Blue to state Red). But that true conflict, we concluded,
should be resolved by subverting state Red's concern for Guest and
his family because giving effect to that concern would have been
unfair to Host. The result, where both Host and Guest have moved
to state Red, should be the same. Whether Host had moved (along
with Guest) to state Red or had remained in state Blue, that state
would have had a strong interest in the enforcement of its anti-guest
statute for Host's protection.
The conclusions advanced in this Part are contrary to certain
remarks of Judge Keating, writing for the majority in Miller v.
1 a four to
Miller,"
three decision of the New York Court of Appeals.
In that case, the court faced a sharp conflict between a Maine statute limiting wrongful death damages to $20,000 and a New York
constitutional provision (originally adopted 1894) that not only permitted full recovery, but prohibited any legislative enactment at61. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968).
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tempting to curtail it. The decedent and his dependents were at all
times domiciled in New York. The defendant (his brother) was domiciled in Maine when the fatal accident occurred there as a result
of his alleged negligent operation of a car in which the decedent was
riding. When a wrongful death action was filed by the decedent's
executrix, the defendant pleaded the $20,000 limitation of the
Maine statute as a partial defense. The executrix-plaintiff's motion
to strike out this defense was sustained by the lower courts and the
defendant appealed.
The intensity of the conflict between New York's constitutional
provision and the Maine statute is obvious. What brought the case
within the scope of this essay was the defendant's change of domicile from Maine to New York about three months after the fatal
accident, but before the suit was filed. Judge Keating, unfortunately, tried to use this event as a means of eliminating the Maine
statute and its policy from the case, thereby resolving the conflict.
To the extent that the Maine limitation evinced a desire to protect
its residents in wrongful death actions, that purpose cannot be
defeated here since no judgment in this action will be entered
against a Maine resident. Maine would have no concern with the
nature of the recovery awarded against defendants who are no
longer residents of that state and who are, therefore, no longer
properobjects of its legislative concern. It is true that, at the time
of the accident, the defendants were residents of Maine but they
would have no vested right to the application of the law of their
fdrmer residence ....

Any claim that Maine has a paternalistic

interest in protecting its residents against liability for acts committed while they were in Maine, should they move to another jurisdiction, is highly speculative ....

2 (Emphasis

added by author.)

Ironically, Judge Keating's inept remarks were totally unnecessary. He could have resolved the conflict between the Maine and
New York rules in either of two well-recognized ways. First, he could
have noted that damage limitation statutes resulted from the fears
of legislators, who had created a cause of action for wrongful death,
that excessive jury verdicts might severely hinder the development
of railroads and other industrial enterprises emerging in the United
States in the mid-nineteenth century. The anachronistic nature of
these statutes is reflected in the fact that they have been abolished
in many states. Second, Judge Keating could have relied upon the
fact that the Maine limitation statute had been repealed prior to the
62. Id. at 21, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741-42, 237 N.E.2d at 882.
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time the suit was filed, indicating that Maine legislators did not feel
that the limitation was necessary to the welfare of its citizens. Or,
he could have simply held that New York, having a strong interest
in the application of its law, was entitled to enforce its own law in
its own courts.
An instructive hypothetical example involving a disadvantageous change of domicile in a contract case has been provided by
Professor Cavers.6 3 In the example, based upon the actual case of
Bernkrant v. Fowler,64 California's statute of frauds invalidated oral
testamentary promises, but Nevada law sustained them if clearly
proven. It was assumed that the plaintiffs and Granrud, the decedent, were all domiciled in California when Granrud (for valuable
consideration) orally promised to release, by his will, any sum owed
to him by them (at his death) on their promissory note secured by
a trustdeed on their building (also assumed to be located in California). Then Professor Cavers supposed that, after making his oral
testamentary promise, Granrud had changed his domicile to Nevada and died there. If the plaintiffs had brought suit against his
estate in Nevada, they might have contended that "Nevada had no
qualms about the oral testamentary contracts of its citizens and
California
policy would no longer be served by the application of its
65
law."

But a decision for the plaintiffs would, Professor Cavers believes, be quite wrong. The policy of the California statute required
that it take effect as soon as the oral promise is made and that it
remain in effect until the promise is reduced to writing. "It [the
statute] does not simply lie dormant pending a shift in the testator's domicile." 6 In other words, the invalidating policy of the California statute would remain in full force for the protection of Granrud and his estate even though he had become domiciled in Nevada.
In concluding the discussion of a post-transaction change of
domicile to the disadvantage of the changing party, it is suggested
that judges should normally give careful consideration to any attempt to create a new liability based on events occurring before the
change of domicile. Careful consideration should also be given to
any attempt to increase the burden of an existing liability based
upon such events, or to deprive the changing party of rights that
63.
64.
65.
66.

Cavers, supra note 26, at 59-61.
55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266 (1961).
Cavers, supra note 26, at 61.
Id.
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accrued prior to the change. Of course, in a case where the state of
the new domicile has at all times had a concern in determining the
legal effects of the acts and events occurring before the change (as
in Miller v. Miller),6 7 the courts of that state may be justified in
enforcing their own law and policy. But they ought not to pretend
that the change has deprived the state of the changing party's former domicile of all concern in the outcome of the case. However,
where, as in our state Red-state Blue tort example and Professor
Cavers' contract example, the state of the new domicile has no
interest (in the usual sense) in the result, its disadvantageous rule
should not be applied. Such application would be grossly unfair to
the changing party and would amount to an officious, unjustified
invasion of the interest of his former domicile.
X.

CONCLUSION

After this lengthy catalog of real and hypothetical cases, an
attempt should be made to reiterate the more important contentions of the essay.
Of these, the most important has been that a major distinction
should be drawn between cases where the application of the law of
the post-transaction domicile would benefit the moving party and
those in which it would operate to his disadvantage. In the first type
of case, the state of the post-transaction domicile has an obvious
concern for the welfare of its new member. But a problem is frequently created by the unfairness to the other party of allowing the
moving party to improve his position by his unilateral posttransaction act.
The second type of case is entirely different. If, prior to the
moving party's change of domicile, the case presented a purely domestic or false conflict problem, the movement of one party to a
state whose law, if applied, would be disadvantageous to him, would
not give that state any interest whatever in the outcome. And if,
prior to the moving party's change of domicile, the case presented
a true conflict problem, as to which the post-transaction domicile
already, had an interest (as in Miller v. Miller),6" that state's interest
would in no way be strengthened or enlarged by the change of domicile. Indeed, Judge Keating did not contend, in Miller v. Miller, that
it would. He merely contended that because the defendant had
changed his domicile from Maine to New York after the fatal acci67. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 237 N.E.2d 877 (1968).
68. Id.
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dent, Maine had no concern, at the time the suit was filed, that its
statute limiting damages should be applied for the defendant's protection. This contention, however, was clearly incorrect. Every state
has a common concern that when one of its domiciliaries moves'to
another state, he should not be deprived of his rights nor subjected
to new or greater liabilities in relation to previous transactions. It
was the duty of the New York court to recognize this concern of the
state of Maine, just as it would had the defendant remained domiciled there.
We return to the case where the moving party would profit by
the application of the law of his post-transaction domicile. In Parts
I through IV, it was pointed out that if the case had originally
presented a purely domestic or false-conflict problem, the posttransaction change of domicile would create a true-conflict problem.
State interest analysis has shown that the solution of true-conflict
problems is the major difficulty encountered in choice of law cases.
Various techniques of reconciliation are available, but each one has
only a limited sphere of application, a particular class of cases in
which it can be used. Moreover, application of the law of the moving
party's post-transaction domicile to his advantage usually involves
some unfairness to the non-moving party. Hence, it was suggested
that in cases where the post-transaction change of domicile has
created a true conflict, the law of the new domicile should usually
be disregarded. This doctrine is supported by the first part of Justice Traynor's opinion in Bernkrant v. Fowler 9 and by the Supreme
Court's decision in the Yates case 70 indicating that application of
the law of a post-transaction domicile may sometimes be unconstitutional.
But an exception to the foregoing doctrine should be made in
cases involving a parent's legal responsibility for the support and
education of a minor child. Some states permit a father's responsibility in this respect to be terminated or limited by a contract between him and the child's mother. But if, after the making of such
a contract, the child should acquire a post-transaction domicile, the
courts of that state would be justified in enforcing their domestic
rules against the father even though their rules are inconsistent with
those of the state of the common domicile of the mother, father and
child in force at the time the contract was signed, and even though
their rules invalidate the contract. This exception is rooted in the
69. 55 Cal.2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal.Rptr. 266 (1961).
70. 299 U.S. 178, 81 L.Ed. 106, 57 S.Ct. 129 (1936).
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particularly vital concern that the state of the minor child's new
domicile has in the child's welfare, coupled with the fact that the
as the father's ability to meet them, will change
child's needs as well
71
time.
to
time
from
Three types of cases have been discussed that radically differ
from those considered in Parts I through IV. The common feature
of all three types was that the post-transaction change of domicile
did not, ipso facto, create a true-conflict problem. It was therefore
suggested that, for reasons varying in each type of case, some consideration should be given to the interest of the new domicile in the
application of its law.
In the type of case illustrated by Clay v. Sun Insurance Office
Ltd.,72 the policies of the pertinent domestic rules indicated that
only the post-transaction domicile (Florida) had any concern in the
outcome of the case. A Florida statute invalidated a time-of-suit
clause that would have denied access to its courts by its citizens
(Clay) in defiance of its Statute of Limitations. No other state had
any concern in the decision.
In the type of case illustrated by a hypothetical example based
on Erwin v. Thomas,73 the laws of the plaintiff's domicile, also the
state of harm, were adverse to her claim. The laws of the defendant's
domicile, also the forum, favored the plaintiff. Thus, the court
might either have dismissed the plaintiff's claim or altruistically
upheld it by applying the law of the defendant's domicile. If,'after
the event, the plaintiff had become domiciled in the state of defendant's domicile, that state would have acquired an interest (in the
usual sense) in the enforcement of its law for the plaintiff's benefit.
Moreover, such enforcement would not conflict with the law and
policy of any other state. In such a case, the court should normally
give some consideration to the effect of plaintiff's change of domicile.
In the type of case illustrated by Haines v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 7 a true-conflict already existed when one party made an
advantageous post-transaction change of domicile. Thus, disregarding the policy implications of the change of domicile would not have
resolved the true conflict. On the contrary, consideration of those
policy implications might well provide an additional ground for enforcing the law of the new domicile, thus assisting in the resolution
71. See text at note 59, supra.
72. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).

73. 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
74. 47 Wis.2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
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of the true conflict. This apparently happened in the Haines case.
It seems inevitable that in similar cases, judges will give at least
some consideration to the policy implications of the change of domicile.
In short, the resolution of true conflict cases has come to be
recognized as the outstanding problem of choice of law in the United
States. The problem created by a post-transaction change of domicile to the advantage of the changing party will be, in many cases,
overshadowed and influenced by the larger problem of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, state policy analysis must recognize the concern of the newly acquired domicile, as well as the element of unfairness to the non-moving party involved in such recognition. Particular policies of particular laws will also influence decisions, as illustrated by the Clay case and Currie's parent and child example. This
essay has suggested a limited number of compromise solutions in
the hope that they may be helpful to judges and advocates-and to
my colleagues who must train the judges and advocates of the future.

